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FORESHADOWING THE FUTURE OF
FORFEITURE/ESTOPPEL
BY WRONGDOING:
DAVIS V. WASHINGTON AND THE
NECESSITY OF THE DEFENDANT’S INTENT
TO INTIMIDATE THE WITNESS
James F. Flanagan*
INTRODUCTION
Justice Scalia’s refusal to define “testimonial” evidence or to
explain the enigmatic reference to “forfeiture by wrongdoing” in
Crawford v. Washington1 continues to raise significant practical
and policy issues in the reformulation of the right of
confrontation, particularly in domestic violence prosecutions.
Forfeiture by wrongdoing is the most significant exception to the
exclusion of testimonial hearsay. Despite its importance, the
only reference to the doctrine in Crawford appeared in Justice
Scalia’s discussion of the defects of the reliability standard of
Ohio v. Roberts,2 and was addressed only to distinguish
forfeiture’s essentially equitable rationale from Roberts’
reliability standard. The Court adopted it in a parenthetical
without any discussion of its elements or the extensive case law
on the topic. The discussion is short: “For example, the rule of
*

Oliver Ellsworth Professor of Federal Practice, University of South
Carolina. L.L.B., University of Pennsylvania, 1967; A.B., University of
Notre Dame, 1964. My thanks to Professor Robert Pitler for including me in
the seminar and to the participants who provided many helpful comments on
the issues discussed in this article.
1
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes
confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not
purport to be an alternative means of determining reliability. See
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59, 25 L.Ed 244
(1879).”3
Crawford & Beyond: Revisited in Dialogue, the second
Crawford focused symposium organized by Professor Robert
Pitler at Brooklyn Law School and held on September 29, 2006,
explored the developing scope of “testimonial” and also focused
on the aforementioned exception to Crawford, the constitutional
doctrine originally known as waiver by misconduct,4 and now
commonly referred to as forfeiture by wrongdoing.
This doctrine provides that a defendant who deliberately acts
to prevent a witness from testifying loses any right to object to
the admission of the witness’ testimonial hearsay statement on
constitutional or evidentiary grounds.5 This doctrine has always
3

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
The modern case law, beginning in 1976, generally referred to the
doctrine as “waiver”, although some cases used the term “forfeiture”, and
others used both terms interchangeably. Federal Rule 804(b)(6) which
codified the doctrine as a rule of evidence was originally titled “waiver by
misconduct”, but was later changed to “forfeiture by misconduct.” James F.
Flanagan, Confrontation, Equity, and the Misnamed Exception for
“Forfeiture” by Wrongdoing, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1193, 1209-18
(2005) [hereinafter The Misnamed Exception for “Forfeiture” by
Wrongdoing].
5
Several pre-Crawford articles discuss the origins of the doctrine and its
promulgation in Federal Rule 804(b)(6). See James F. Flanagan, Forfeiture
by Wrongdoing and Those Who Acquiesce in Witness Intimidation: A Reach
Exceeding its Grasp and Other Problems with Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(6), 51 DRAKE L. REV. 459 (2003) [hereinafter Forfeiture by
Wrongdoing] (discussing the development, elements and procedure of the
doctrine originally known as waiver by misconduct codified in Federal Rule
of Evidence 804(b)(6)); Leonard Birdsong, The Exclusion of Hearsay
Through Forfeiture by Wrongdoing—Old Wine in a New Bottle—Solving the
Mystery of the Codification of the Concept into Rule 804(b)(6), 80 NEB. L.
REV. 891 (2001); Enrico B. Valdez & Shelley A. Nieto Dahlberg, Tales from
the Crypt: An Examination of Forfeiture by Misconduct and its Applicability
to the Texas Legal System, 31 ST. MARY’S L. J. 99 (1999); Richard D.
Friedman, Confrontation and the Definition of Chutzpa, 31 ISR. L. REV. 506
4

FLANAGAN

6/22/2007 1:10 AM

FORESHADOWING THE FUTURE OF FORFEITURE 865
required that the defendant specifically intend to prevent the
witness from testifying, and was previously limited to cases of
deliberate
witness
tampering.6
However,
Crawford’s
characterization of this doctrine as “forfeiture” by wrongdoing
has created an unfortunate misperception about its scope,7
prompting some courts to expand the doctrine beyond its
original use in witness tampering cases to admit any victim’s
testimonial hearsay, provided the defendant can be found
responsible for the witness’ unavailability to testify for any
reason.
This expansion of the doctrine thus creates a broad exception
to the Confrontation Clause for all testimonial hearsay from an
unavailable victim. In the lower courts, a conflict is emerging
between this expanded rule of forfeiture and that expressed in
Reynolds v. United States8 and the pre-Crawford cases, which
held that the right of confrontation can only be lost by deliberate
action aimed at preventing the witness from testifying.9
This article focuses on the intent element of the constitutional
forfeiture or estoppel by wrongdoing doctrine. Part I briefly
(1997) [hereinafter Chutzpa]; John R. Kroger, The Confrontation Waiver
Rule, 76 B.U.L. REV. 835 (1996); Alycia Sykora, Forfeiture by Misconduct:
Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), 75 Or. L. Rev. 855 (1996);
Paul T. Markland, The Admission of Hearsay Evidence Where Defendant
Misconduct Causes the Unavailability of a Prosecution Witness, 43 AM. U.
L. REV. 995 (1994); David J. Tess, Losing the Right to Confront: Defining
Waiver to Better Address a Defendant’s Actions and Their Effects on a
Witness, 27 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 877 (1994).
6
See infra notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
7
Flanagan, The Misnamed Exception for “Forfeiture” by Wrongdoing,
supra note 4, at 1218-23; infra notes 40-50 and accompanying text.
8
98 U.S. 145 (1878).
9
Compare Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 170 (Mass.
2005) (adopting specific intent to prevent testimony), and State v. AlvarezLopez, 98 P.3d 699 (N.M. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1334, 1335
(2005) (same) with People v. Giles, No. S129852, 2007 WL 635716 (Cal.
Sup. Ct. March 5, 2007), (adopting strict forfeiture rule), cert. granted, 102
P.3d 930 (Cal. 2004); Gonzalez v. State, 155 S.W. 3d 603, 610 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2004) (adopting strict forfeiture rule), aff’d, No. PD-0247-05, 2006 WL
1688345 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (advocating strict forfeiture rule but finding
intent under the facts).
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recapitulates the doctrine’s development, with emphasis on the
principal precedent, Reynolds v. United States,10 and follows
with the effect that Crawford’s brief reference to the doctrine
has had by implying that it could be used in any case in which
the defendant can be held responsible for the witness’s
unavailability for any reason. Part II analyzes the post-Crawford
opinion in Davis v. Washington11 and concludes that the Court
views the doctrine as directed against witness tampering, which
is consistent with the pre-Crawford case law that required the
defendant’s intent to prevent testimony. Part III then addresses
some procedural issues the Court will have to consider as it
further defines the doctrine, including the causal link between
the defendant’s acts and the witness’s unavailability for trial, the
need for a hearing to determine admissibility, and whether
additional foundation evidence beyond the hearsay itself is
necessary to admit victim hearsay. Finally, Part III addresses the
point that, under current applications of the doctrine, the finding
that the defendant was responsible for the witness’ unavailability
to testify not only allows the prosecution to admit the absent
witness’ hearsay, but under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a),
precludes the defendant from offering any of the victim’s
hearsay. This article argues that the defendant’s right to present
a defense, most recently reaffirmed in Holmes v. South
Carolina12 overcomes this rule of evidence, so that a defendant
cannot be precluded from offering admissible evidence under
that rule simply because he was the procuring cause of the
witness’ unavailability.

10
11
12

Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 145.
126 S. Ct. 2266, 2270 (2006).
126 S. Ct. 1727, 1729 (2006).
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I. ESTOPPEL BY WRONGDOING AND CRAWFORD’S EXPANSIVE
EFFECT ON THE DOCTRINE
A. Short Note on Terminology and the Tyranny of Labels
Words matter, and this article deliberately uses the term
“estoppel by wrongdoing” to describe the doctrine by which a
defendant may lose his right to confrontation by acting against a
witness, rather than the term used by Justice Scalia in
Crawford—“forfeiture by wrongdoing.”13 The principal reason
is to avoid what Justice Cardozo called the “tyranny of
labels.”14 The key issue in determining the scope of the doctrine
is the necessity of the defendant’s intent to prevent the witness
from testifying. Labeling the rule as one of forfeiture all but
assumes that intent is irrelevant to the loss of the right to
confrontation. The term forfeiture connotes an automatic and
unintentional loss of a right upon the happening of a specified
condition.15 The courts reaching this decision after Crawford
rely heavily on the term forfeiture to justify that result.16
Moreover, this simplistic analysis makes it easy to ignore the
historical and constitutional reasons for an intent element. I have
argued that the constitutional doctrine is better viewed as one of
waiver,17 but using that term may be viewed as assuming my
13

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 114 (1934), overruled by
Mallow v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1978).
15
Peter Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of
Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1214, 121415 (1977) (distinguishing between constitutional rights that may be
unknowingly forfeited by a guilty plea from constitutional rights that can only
be deliberately waived based upon the interest of the state in being able to
retry the defendant).
16
See, e.g., People v. Giles, No. S129852, 2007 WL 635716 at *9
(Cal. Sup. Ct. March 5, 2007) (rejecting defendant’s argument that doctrine
is based on waiver by pointing to term “forfeiture” used in Crawford).
17
Flanagan, The Misnamed Exception for “Forfeiture” by Wrongdoing,
supra note 4, at 1203-23 (tracing the history of the doctrine from its English
antecedents to modern case law, the adoption of FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6),
14
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conclusion, just as forfeiture assumes that intent is irrelevant. To
avoid a debate dominated by value laden terms, the Article uses
the more neutral and more accurate name of estoppel by
wrongdoing. Crawford mentioned its equitable origins18 and
Professor Friedman has argued that the doctrine is based on
estoppel.19 Estoppel accommodates both waiver and forfeiture
while also incorporating the rich traditions of equity that may be
necessary to define the contours of this important constitutional
doctrine.20 I will refer to the rule that one may lose
confrontation rights by conduct against witnesses as one of
estoppel by wrongdoing, or of confrontation estoppel, unless
direct citation requires otherwise.
B. A Short History of the Constitutional Doctrine of
Estoppel by Wrongdoing
Reynolds v. United States21 is the principal Supreme Court
precedent used to determine whether the defendant loses the
right to confrontation because of conduct against a witness.
Reynolds was a case of “intentional” witness tampering because
the defendant deliberately concealed the location of his second
wife during a bigamy prosecution to prevent her from being
subpoenaed in his second trial. The Court found that his acts
were an intentional waiver of his right to confrontation. Chief
Justice Waite noted that Reynolds had been given every chance
to reveal the location of the witness, but chose not to do so:
“Having the means of making the necessary explanation, and
having every inducement to do so if he would, the presumption
and to Crawford and arguing that the cases are based on express or implied
waiver, and that the description as “forfeiture” was made erroneously and
without analysis).
18
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
19
Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 5 at 516-17.
20
Flanagan, The Misnamed Exception for “Forfeiture” by Wrongdoing,
supra note 4, at 1241-45 (arguing that equitable considerations help define the
doctrine, and may impose obligations on the prosecution when it seeks to
invoke it.).
21
98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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is that he considered it better to rely upon the weakness of the
case made against him than to attempt to develop the strength of
his own.”22 The opinion also used an estoppel rationale based
upon the defendant’s deliberate choice to conceal the witness.
The Constitution “grants him the privilege of being confronted
with the witnesses against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the
witnesses away, he cannot insist on his privilege.”23 The Court
also stated that the doctrine is triggered by the defendant’s
wrongful act: “The rule has its foundation in the maxim that no
one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong; and,
consequently, if there has not been, in legal contemplation, a
wrong committed, the way has not been opened for the
introduction of the testimony.”24 The admitted wrong in
Reynolds was the defendant’s deliberate concealment of the
witness, which supported the waiver and estoppel rationales.
The constitutional rule stated in Reynolds was that a
deliberate intention to prevent a witness from testifying supports
the loss of confrontation as to that witness. This principle had
little impact until the Sixth Amendment became applicable to the
states nearly 90 years later in the 1960s.25 In the 1970s, the
lower courts began facing deliberate witness tampering in drug
22

Id. at 160.
Id. at 158. The Court also recognized that the judicial process had
legitimate and lawful responses to such conduct. “If therefore, when [the
witnesses are] absent by [the defendant’s] procurement, their evidence is
supplied in some lawful way, he is in no condition to assert that his
constitutional rights have been violated.” Id. The modern cases, faced with
more brutal organized crime and drug conspiracies see witness tampering as a
direct attack on the judicial system. See e.g., United States v. White, 116
F.3d 903, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that the “forfeiture principle, as
distinct from the Confrontation Clause, is designed to prevent a defendant
from thwarting the normal operation of the criminal justice system); United
States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1204 (1984) (describing the murder of a witness as “behavior which
strikes at the heart of the justice system itself”).
24
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 159.
25
See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (“We hold today that
the Sixth Amendment’s right of an accused to confront the witnesses against
him is likewise a fundamental right and is made obligatory on the States by
the Fourteenth Amendment”).
23
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and organized crime cases and the prosecution often offered the
absent witness’ hearsay. The courts used Reynolds to resolve the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment claims by concluding that
deliberate witness intimidation waived the right of
confrontation.26
As in Reynolds, the modern cases all involved acts against
declarants because of their status as witnesses. All the cases
mentioned the victim’s status as an actual or potential witness or
the defendant’s acts against a witness.27 As in Reynolds, the
rationale was that the defendant expressly or implicitly waived
the right by deliberate conduct inconsistent with actually desiring
to confront that witness.28 No pre-Crawford case held that the
Confrontation Clause was satisfied merely because the defendant
was the procuring but unintentional cause of the witness’
absence.29 In fact, the courts refused to extend estoppel by
26

Flanagan, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing, supra note 5 at 466-69.
See, e.g., United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279 (1st Cir.
1996) (stating that “intent to deprive prosecution of testimony need not be the
actor’s sole motivation.”); United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir.
1992) (stating test is whether defendant procures a witness’ absence); United
States v. Potamitis, 739 F.2d 784, 788 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating defendant
waives confrontation right “when his own conduct is responsible for a
witness’ unavailability at trial”); Rice v. Marshall, 709 F.2d 1100, 1101 (6th
Cir. 1983) (stating declarant was an expected witness against defendant),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1034 (1984); United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d
269, 271 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating declarant was murdered on way to testify);
United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 630 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that a
“defendant who causes a witness to be unavailable for trial for the purpose of
preventing that witness from testifying also waives his right of
confrontation”); Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1198-98 (6th Cir. 1982)
(stating that defendant has procured his wife’s refusal to testify); United
States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 629 (10th Cir. 1979) (stating “the law should
not permit an accused to subvert a criminal prosecution by causing witnesses,
not to testify at trial”) (emphasis added); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d
1346, 1358 (8th Cir. 1976) (noting that defendant acted only when he learned
that declarant was going to testify at his trial). See also, United States v.
Jordan, No. Crim, 04-CR-229-B 2005 WL 513501 at *6 (D. Colo. Mar. 3.
2005) (stating that no Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6) case holds that a murder
whose byproduct is the unavailability of a witness is covered by the rule).
28
Id.
29
A few pre-Crawford cases, taken in isolation, may be viewed as
27
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wrongdoing to ordinary manslaughter cases,30 or to apply it
when the defendant acted for reasons unrelated to potential
testimony.31 Thus, the Supreme Court in Reynolds, as well as
federal and state appellate courts, articulated and applied a
constitutional standard based on express or implied waiver or
estoppel inferred from the defendant’s knowing misconduct
against a potential witness. This approach was consistent with
prior constitutional cases because the Supreme Court has always
viewed the loss of confrontation rights as based on principles of

supporting a true forfeiture theory. One court held that a defendant’s slaying
of a government agent in an exchange of gunfire during a bungled arrest was
sufficient to avoid a Confrontation Clause claim. Interestingly, the court
described it as a waiver of his right of confrontation. United States v. Rouco,
765 F.2d 983, 995 (11th Cir. 1985). Another speaks of the doctrine without
mentioning an intent to prevent testimony. See United States v. Emery, 186
F.3d 921, 926 (8th Cir. 1999) (convicting defendant of intentionally
tampering with declarant/witness under federal witness tampering statute).
United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 648 (2d Cir. 1997) (suggesting that
intent was relevant but not necessary).
30
Commonwealth v. Laich, 777 A.2d 1057, 1064 n.4 (Pa. 2001)
(rejecting misconduct exception in manslaughter prosecution); Wyatt v. State,
981 P.2d 109, 115 n.11 (Alaska. 1999) (recognizing that forfeiture by
misconduct does not apply to domestic homicide); Cf. State v. Jarzbek, 529
A.2d 1245, 1253 (Conn. 1987) (stating that “The constitutional right of
confrontation would have little force, however, if we were to find an implied
waiver of that right in every instance where the accused, in order to silence
his victim uttered threats during the commission of the crime for which he is
on trial.”); People v. Maher, 677 N.E.2d 728, 731 (N.Y. 1997) (holding that
the exception does not apply to murder unrelated to testimony). People v.
Flowers, 667 N.Y.S.2d 546, 547 (App. Div. 1997) (same). See also
Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 175 (Mass. 2005) (refusing to
apply forfeiture doctrine to defendants who did not arrange for witness’s
absence).
31
United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding
that accessory who did not threaten defendant did not waive confrontation
rights); United States v. Houlihan, 887 F. Supp. 352, 363-64 (D. Mass.
1995) (holding that codefendant Fitzgerald participated in murder as favor for
another gang but did not intend to prevent victim from testifying); State v.
Hansen, 312 N.W.2d 96, 105-06 (Minn. 1981) (finding no proof that this
defendant threatened witnesses).
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waiver, express or implied, rather than a true forfeiture.32
Furthermore, the estoppel or waiver rationale was doctrinally
necessary to address Confrontation Clause claims because the
reliability standard of Ohio v. Roberts33 was inapplicable to
victim hearsay offered under estoppel by wrongdoing. As Justice
Scalia noted in Crawford, there was never a claim that
intimidated witness statements were reliable,34 and this evolving
doctrine could not be considered a “firmly rooted” hearsay
exception. Lacking any claim of reliable hearsay to satisfy
Roberts, the only rationale to support the loss of confrontation
rights was waiver or estoppel.
In practice, however, constitutional analysis became largely
irrelevant. With estoppel by wrongdoing the courts soon
concluded that a factual finding of witness tampering resolved
both constitutional and evidence claims, shifting the focus to the
evidence of witness tampering.35 Roberts essentially eliminated
confrontation claims arising from other hearsay because its
reliability standard was easy to meet under the rules of
evidence.36 Thus, confrontation issues became evidence issues.37
32

Flanagan, The Misnamed Exception for “Forfeiture” by Wrongdoing,
supra note 4, at 1223-31.
33
448 U.S. 56 (1980). Prior to Roberts the courts seemed to be using a
reliability standard. See United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1357-58
(8th Cir. 1976) (discussing indicia of reliability); Mueller & Kirkpatrick,
EVIDENCE § 8.85 at 971 (3rd ed. 2003) (noting that the Court favored the
reliability standard).
34
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
35
United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 626 (10th Cir. 1979) (“A
valid waiver of the constitutional right is a fortiori a valid waiver of an
objection under the rules of evidence.”). Other courts quickly followed
Balano. See United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982);
United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921 926-27 (8th Cir. 1999); United States
v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 911-12 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v.
Houlihan, 92 F.3d. 1271, 1279-80 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Aguiar,
975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992).
36
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62-69.
37
Several of the speakers at the symposium noted this trend. See
Margaret Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A
Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557 (1992);
Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86
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Reflecting this trend, Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6),
originally titled Waiver by Misconduct but promulgated as
Forfeiture by Wrongdoing, was adopted in 1996.38 Nevertheless,
both the evidence rule and the constitutional rule required a
specific intent to procure the unavailability of the witness.39
Similarly, the states adopted an intent element when they
promulgated rules of evidence40 or adopted the estoppel doctrine
by judicial decision.41 Consequently, the rules of evidence stated
the constitutional standard for loss of confrontation rights.42
GEO. L. REV 1011 (1998); Randolph A. Jonakait, The Right to Confrontation:
Not a Mere Restraint on Government, 76 MINN. L. REV. 615 (1992).
38
Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of
April 22, 1996.
39
See Id. The rule does not exclude as hearsay any “statement offered
against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was
intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.”
Id. See generally, FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).
40
MIL. R. EVID. 804(b)(6); UNIF. R. EVID. 804(b)(6); DEL. R. EVID.
804(b)(6); HAW. R. EVID. 804(b)(7); MICH. R. EVID. 804(b)(6); N.D. R.
EVID. 804(b)(6); OHIO R. EVID 804(B)(6); PA. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).TENN. R.
EVID. 804(b)(6) (deleting “acquiescence”). The governor of Maryland
proposed a comparable provision in 1994, but it was not adopted. Paul W.
Grimm & Jerome E. Deise, Jr., Hearsay, Confrontation, and Forfeiture by
Wrongdoing: Crawford v. Washington, A Reassessment of the Confrontation
Clause, 35 U. BALT. L.F. 5, 41 (2004). After Crawford, Oregon amended its
version of the evidence rule to delete the intent requirement when the party
caused the witnesses’ unavailability by criminal conduct. OR. REV. STAT.
40.465. California enacted an estoppel provision in 1985 that was more
restrictive than rule 804(b)(6). CAL. EVID. CODE § 1350.
41
See Steele, 684 F.2d at 1199-1200 (noting unreported Ohio Court of
Appeals opinion admitted evidence because of threats); State v. Valencia, 924
P.2d 497 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); Devonshire v. United States, 691 A.2d 165,
166 (D.C. 1997); State v. Hallum, 606 N.W.2d 351 (Iowa 2000); State v.
Gettings, 769 P.2d 25 (Kan. 1989); State v. Magouirk, 539 So. 2d 50, 64-66
(La. Ct. App. 1988) (on rehearing); State v. Black, 291 N.W.2d 208, 213-14
(Minn. 1980); State v. Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1984) (applying wavier by threats to overcome defendant’s objections to use
of video by child witness); Matter of Holtzman v. Hellenbrand, 460
N.Y.S.2d 591, 597-98 (App. Div. 1983).
42
Some courts depreciate the importance of Rule 804(b)(6) in
determining the constitutionality of the doctrine of estoppel by wrongdoing by
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Thus, the history of estoppel by wrongdoing from Reynolds to
the modern case law, including the rules of evidence, always
required the defendant’s knowledge of the declarant’s status as a
witness and intentional efforts to prevent that witness from
testifying. 43
Crawford did not discuss or change the constitutional
standard for estoppel by wrongdoing. In the two sentences that
mentioned the doctrine, Justice Scalia cited as authority only
Reynolds, a witness tampering case. Perhaps relying on the title
of Rule 804(b)(6), however, he referred to the doctrine as
forfeiture by wrongdoing,44 which had immediate consequences.
Forfeiture implied that intent was irrelevant, and that
confrontation rights could be terminated whenever the witness’
absence could be traced to the defendant, although a by-product
and unintended consequence of the defendant’s act.45 In
particular, it suggested that confrontation rights could be lost,
not only in witness tampering cases, but in any prosecution
where the defendant could arguably be found responsible for the
witness’ absence. Professor Richard Friedman had argued that
the intent to prevent testimony was unnecessary for forfeiture by
wrongdoing.46 Moreover, some language in Reynolds, if it were
arguing that a constitutional standard should not depend upon the “vagaries of
the Rules of Evidence.” United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 370
(6th Cir. 2005). In doing so, they ignore the history which clearly shows that
the evidence rule is the constitutional standard.
43
See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
44
The two sentences were short and enigmatic. “For example, the rule
of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation
claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not purport to be an
alternative means of determining reliability. See Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145, 158-59, 25 L.Ed 244 (1879).” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62
(2004).
45
Adam M. Krischer, Though Justice May be Blind, It Is Not Stupid, 38
PROSECUTOR 14 (Nov. Dec. 2004) (arguing that perpetrators of domestic
violence automatically forfeit their right to confront their victims).
46
Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 5, at 518 n. 25 (taking into account
defendant’s accidental collision affecting witness on way to court); Id. at 519
n. 30 (noting that legitimate advice to claim a privilege may avoid forfeiture
only if witness is a close relative). Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6) used the term in
the title, and it first appeared in a footnote in an opinion where the Sixth
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freed from its facts and the other rationales that supported the
decision, seemed to justify a strict approach because “no one
shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong.”47 Since
Crawford directly impacted domestic violence prosecutions, it
was inevitable that the outer limits of forfeiture would be
emphasized in those cases.48
The immediate reaction of some state courts was the
application of estoppel by wrongdoing to homicide cases, in part
because this approach avoided difficult decisions on what
constitute testimonial statements.49 The first case interpreting
Circuit mused about its underlying rationale, while finding specific intent to
prevent the witness from testifying in that case. Steele, 684 F.2d at 1201 n.8.
47
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 159.
48
Much of the commentary after Crawford focused on domestic violence
cases and the utility of the forfeiture exception in those prosecutions. See,
e.g., Jeanine Percival, The Price of Silence: The Prosecution of Domestic
Violence Cases in Light of Crawford v. Washington, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 212
(2005); Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too, 71
BROOK. L. REV. 311 (2005); Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After
Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747 (2005); Matthew M. Stabb, Child’s Play:
Avoiding the Pitfalls of Crawford v. Washington in Child Abuse Prosecution,
108 W. VA. L. REV. 501 (2005); Andrew King-Ries, Crawford v.
Washington: The End of Victimless Prosecution? 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 301
(2005); Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic Violence, Child Abuse, and
Trustworthiness Exceptions After Crawford, 20 CRIM. JUST. 24 (2005); Adam
M. Krischer, Though Justice May be Blind, It Is Not Stupid, 38 PROSECUTOR
14 (Nov. Dec. 2004); Allie Phillips, A Flurry of Court Interpretations:
Weathering the Storm After Crawford v. Washington, 38 PROSECUTOR 37
(Nov./Dec. 2004).
49
Many of the post-Crawford cases used forfeiture to avoid the
testimonial issue. United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir.
2005) (avoiding decision on whether excited utterance was testimonial);
People v. Baca, No. E032929 2004 WL 2750083 at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec.
2 2004) (avoiding whether identification was testimonial); People v. Jiles, 18
Cal. Rptr. 3d 790, 795 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (avoiding issue of dying
declaration as testimonial); State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 793-94 (Kan. 2004)
(avoiding issue of whether response to police question was testimonial);
People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (avoiding issue
of whether casual statements to police are testimonial); Gonzalez v. State,
155 S.W.3d 605, 609 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (avoiding issue of whether
statements to police were testimonial).
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Crawford, State v. Meeks,50 was decided six weeks after
Crawford. In Meeks, the Supreme Court of Kansas admitted the
homicide victim’s identification of his assailant.51 The court
extended earlier witness tampering precedent in Kansas to
uphold the introduction of the decedent’s identification of his
assailant, principally relying on the maxim that “the law simply
cannot countenance a defendant deriving benefits from
murdering the chief witness against him.”52 The California
Court of Appeals had a similar response in People v. Giles,53 a
domestic homicide case where it was conceded that there was no
evidence that the defendant killed the victim to prevent her
testimony.54 The court peremptorily rejected the defendant’s
argument that such proof was required by precedent, in favor of
an argument relying on forfeiture principles.55 The California
Supreme Court affirmed the decision, again relying principally
on its title as a forfeiture.56 Several other state courts57 and at
50

88 P.3d 789 (Kan. 2004).
Id. at 792-93.
52
Id. at 794; State v. Gettings, 769 P.2d 25, 28 (Kan. 1989).
53
19 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 843 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2004), aff’d No. S129852,
2007 WL 635716 at * 9 (Cal. Sup. Ct. March 5, 2007),
54
Id. at 848.
55
Id. The court further noted that:
Although the [Houlihan] opinion contains language suggesting
that a killing must be motivated by a desire to silence the victim
to trigger a forfeiture of the right of confrontation, we see no
reason why the doctrine should be so limited to such cases.
Forfeiture is a logical extension of the equitable principle that no
person should benefit from his own wrongful acts. A defendant
whose intentional criminal act renders a witness unavailable for
trial benefits from his crime if he can use the witness’s
unavailability to exclude damaging hearsay statements by the
witness that would otherwise be admissible. This is so whether
or not the defendant specifically intended to prevent the witness
from testifying at the time he committed the act that rendered
the witness unavailable.
Id. at 843, 848, 848n.3 (citing U.S. v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279 (1st
Cir. 1996)).
56
“Defendant’s argument relating to the intent requirement rests on the
premise that the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine is, in essence, not based
51
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least one federal court58 also adopted the strict view that any act
by the defendant which had the effect, albeit unintended, of
preventing testimony would trigger a forfeiture of confrontation
rights. As in Meeks and Giles, these courts relied on the
argument that the defendant should not benefit from his
wrongful conduct, ignoring the witness tampering facts in
Reynolds and other cases that were based on principles of waiver
and estoppel flowing from the defendant’s voluntary choice.59
on broad forfeiture principles, but instead on waiver principles. . . .
However, the United States Supreme Court has characterized the rule in
question as a ‘forfeiture’ that ‘extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially
equitable grounds,’ not a waiver (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at [p. 62, 124
S. Ct. 1354).” People v. Giles, No. S129852, 2007 WL 635716 at * 9 (Cal.
Sup. Ct. March 5, 2007).
57
People v. Moore, 117 P.3d 1, 5 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004); Gonzales v.
State, 155 S.W. 3d 603 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, No. PD-0247-05 2006
WL 1688345 (Tex Crim. App. 2006) (finding intent to prevent testimony and
deferring decision on whether such intent is required); State v. Jensen, 727
N.W.2d 518 (Wisc. 2007).
58
United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 370-71 (6th Cir. 2005).
59
Id. (arguing that the defendant, regardless of intent, “would benefit
through his own wrongdoing if such a witness’ statements could not be used
against him); People v. Baca, No. E032929 2004 WL 2750083 at *12 n.6
(Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (questioning intent element by contending that if the
forfeiture rule is to further the maxim that “no one shall be permitted to take
advantage of his own wrong (citation omitted) than the motivation for the
wrongdoing is irrelevant.”); People v. Moore, 117 P.3d 1, 5 (Colo. Ct. App.
2004) (stating that under the forfeiture rule a person is not to benefit from his
wrongful prevention of testimony); Gonzales v. State, 155 S.W.3d. 603, 610
(Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (adopting language of People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr.
3d at 848, that a defendant whose wrongful act renders a witness unavailable
for trial benefits from his conduct if he can use the witness’ unavailability to
exclude otherwise admissible hearsay statements regardless of intent). The
maxim also is cited in many cases where the intent to prevent testimony was
required. In those cases, however, the courts also referred to waiver,
estoppel, and other rationales that emphasized the deliberate nature of the act.
E.g., United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 652 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing
maxim and equity and need for fit incentives for defendants); United States v.
Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 630 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding waiver by deliberate
murder of witness and citing maxim); United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d
269, 272-73 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing maxim but remanding for consideration of
whether defendant waived right by participating in murder of witness in any
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This post-Crawford case development expanded the doctrine
beyond prior precedent and history, creating new questions for
the Court to address.
II. DAVIS V. WASHINGTON—FORESHADOWING THE FUTURE OF THE
ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE
Davis v. Washington60 was the Supreme Court’s first return
to Crawford and provided an opportunity to address the scope of
the terms “testimonial” and estoppel by wrongdoing. Justice
Scalia authored the opinion as he had in Crawford, and he
narrowed the definition of testimonial, all but stating that the
estoppel doctrine is limited to witness-tampering cases.61 The
issue in Davis,62 and its companion case Hammond v. Indiana,63
was whether statements made in a 911 call in Davis, and at the
crime scene in Hammond, were testimonial statements under
Crawford.64 The majority drew the line based on the objective
purpose of the inquiry.
Statements are non-testimonial when made in the
course of police interrogation under circumstances
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an
ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no
such ongoing emergency, and that the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove
past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.65
way); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1358-60 (8th Cir. 1976)
(citing maxim and also stating that defendant waived right of confrontation by
intimidation when he learned that witness would testify, as well as estoppel
principles).
60
126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
61
See infra notes 70-92 and accompanying text.
62
Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
63
Id.
64
Id. at 2270.
65
Id. at 2273-74.
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The Court in Davis held that the victim’s identification of
her assailant to the operator in the initial stage of a 911 call was
not testimonial because it was made to the operator during an
ongoing emergency.66 The statements in Hammond, on the other
hand, were deemed testimonial, having been made after the
police arrived, had separated the husband-assailant from the
victim, and learned from her that things were “fine.” The Court
concluded that the police were not reacting to an emergency but
were investigating and establishing the historical facts of the
situation.67 Davis’ broad definition of testimonial statements
reflects an expansive view of the Confrontation Clause.
Perhaps anticipating criticism for the broad definition of
testimonial statements, the Court discussed the estoppel by
wrongdoing doctrine in section IV of its opinion in Davis. The
states and others had argued that domestic violence cases
required “greater flexibility in the use of testimonial evidence”68
and that the higher incidence of witness intimidation in those
cases required a narrow definition of testimonial. “When this
occurs, the Confrontation Clause gives the criminal a
windfall.”69 This windfall argument is another form of the
rationale in Reynolds70 that “no one shall be permitted to take
advantage of his own wrong” and is often relied upon to justify
on strict forfeiture grounds the loss of confrontation rights in the
all too typical domestic homicide case.71
The Court rejected the windfall argument and its analogue,
the benefits rationale: “We may not, however, vitiate
constitutional guarantees when they have the effect of allowing
the guilty to go free.”72 Constitutional rights would have no
meaning if they were available only when they provided no
protection.73 Moreover, to consider constitutional rights as
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id. at 2276-78.
Id. at 2278-79.
Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2279 (2006).
Id. at 2280.
98 U.S. 145, 159 (1878).
See supra note 61.
Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280 (citation omitted).
Michael J. Polelle, The Death of Dying Declarations in a Post-
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benefits of the crime misstates their importance as fundamental,
pre-existing protections inherent in citizenship.74 In rejecting the
windfall and benefits arguments, the Court rejected the principal
rationale underlying the strict rule of forfeiture, which views
intent as irrelevant.
The Davis opinion then discussed estoppel by wrongdoing in
a context that emphasized its witness tampering underpinnings.
But when defendants seek to undermine the judicial
process by procuring or coercing silence from
witnesses and victims, the Sixth Amendment does not
require courts to acquiesce. While defendants have no
duty to assist the State in proving their guilt, they do
have a duty to refrain from acting in ways that
destroy the integrity of the criminal-trial system. We
reiterate what we said in Crawford; that “the rule of
forfeiture
by
wrongdoing . . .
extinguishes
confrontation claims on essentially equitable
grounds.”75
That is, one who obtains the absence of a witness by
wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation.76
The opinion identifies the evil addressed by the estoppel
doctrine as acts that undermine the judicial process, specifically
by procuring or coercing silence from witnesses. The terms
“coercing” and “procuring” refer to intentional action
specifically directed toward achieving a goal.77 In this context,
Crawford World, 71 MO. L. REV. 285, 308 (2006) (describing constitutional
rights as virtual rights if they are forfeited at the point where they are most
needed).
74
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, 829-30 (1975) (identifying
notice, confrontation, and compulsory process as personal rights).
Constitutional rights are not “benefits” of a crime. Defendants do not commit
crimes to obtain constitutional rights. They are preexisting and inherent rights
accorded defendants in our courts by the Constitution.
75
541 U.S. at 62, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158-59).
76
Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280.
77
Procure is defined as “to care for, take care of, attend to, look after;
to put forth or employ care or effort; to do one’s best; to endeavor, labour,
to use means; take measures.” VII Oxford English Dictionary (1989). Coerce
is defined as: “to constrain or restrain (a voluntary or moral agent) by the
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those terms describe purposeful acts intended to produce the
silence of the witnesses. The words, and the Court’s discussion,
are inconsistent with any theory that the defendant’s intent is
irrelevant or that merely being the proximate cause of the
witness’ unavailability is sufficient grounds to support the loss of
confrontation rights.
The paragraph’s focus on judicial integrity reflects the
particularly heinous nature of witness tampering and its effect on
the judicial process. Witness tampering attacks the judicial
process because the consequences multiply beyond the original
perpetrator and victim to other witnesses against that
perpetrator, and its in terrorum effect reverberates among all
those who might testify against violent criminals. Not only may
the defendant be guilty of the original crime, but witness
intimidation is an additional violation that makes it more difficult
to prosecute the first crime, as well as the subsequent
intimidation of the witnesses to that crime. In contrast, an
ordinary homicide, while a tragedy for the victim and the family
and a crime against society that demands prosecution, is not an
attack on the judicial process, which remains available and
unhindered in determining if criminal sanctions are appropriate.
By pointing to the judicial process, the Court necessarily
limits estoppel by wrongdoing to the defendant’s deliberate acts
taken after the crime because of the victim’s status as a potential
witness, and intended to prevent that testimony. The judicial
process begins with the crime and includes the investigation that
gathers the evidence and introduces it at trial.78 Justice Scalia
application of force, or by authority resting on force; to constrain, to compel
obedience by forcible means.” Id. at Vol. III.
78
The judicial process includes pre-indictment activity because
Constitutional rights, such as the Fourth Amendment, provide constant
protection and are enforced later at the trial. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961) (suppressing evidence seized as the result of an illegal search).
Likewise, the Miranda warnings, and Due Process restrictions against
suggestive photographic or lineup identifications, apply before formal charges
are instituted. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring warnings
about self-incrimination and right to counsel when questioned in custody);
Simmons v. United States, 590 U.S.377 (1968) (holding that impermissibly
suggestive identifications are subject to the Due Process Clause if made
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states that constitutional rights are balanced with responsibilities.
The defendant does not have to cooperate with the state in either
the investigation or the trial.79 The state may not compel selfincrimination,80 and at trial the defendant may stand mute81 and
the government has the burden of proving guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.82 But neither may the defendant interfere with
the state’s efforts by making witnesses to the crime unavailable.
“One who obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing
forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation.”83 The Court is
clearly speaking of the post-crime activities of the defendant.
The estoppel doctrine applies only when the defendant interferes
with the judicial process; there is no suggestion that it applies
when the defendant’s acts toward the victim are unrelated to
potential testimony. Any homicide investigation and prosecution
by its nature takes place without the decedent, but the
commission of that crime has never been considered sufficient to
automatically lose any constitutional right, including the right of
confrontation.84 If it were, it would smack of dispensing with
before counsel appointed). The Sixth Amendment protections of the right of
counsel, to proper venue, and to confrontation, are trial rights that are
triggered by the formal charges. The estoppel doctrine also applies before
arrest or formal charges. It even applies although an investigation is not
pending, and there is no indictment, so long as the defendant acts because
there is a possibility that the witnesses would testify. United States v. Miller,
116 F.3d 641, 668 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that an ongoing criminal
proceeding in which declarant was to testify is not required); United States v.
Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279-80 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding estoppel by
wrongdoing applies to potential witnesses). It would be an artificial
distinction to suggest that witness intimidation before arrest, arraignment, or
indictment is not an attack on the integrity of the judicial system.
79
Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280.
80
U.S. Const. amend. V.
81
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (holding that the
defendant’s right not to testify includes the right not to have comment on that
decision).
82
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 375 (1970) (holding that proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is required by the Due Process clause).
83
Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280.
84
The dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule may also be an
exception to the testimonial standard established by Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56
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constitutional rights because of a defendant’s obvious guilt. Even
those post-Crawford cases that argue for a strict forfeiture
rationale do not justify it as an attack on the judicial process.
Rather, they maintain that the defendant should not benefit from
his own wrongdoing,85 that is, the original homicide.
The second paragraph of section IV of the Davis opinion
provides direct evidence that the estoppel doctrine is limited to
deliberate witness intimidation.
We take no position on the standards necessary to
demonstrate such forfeiture, but federal courts using
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), which codifies
the forfeiture doctrine, have generally held the
Government to the preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard. State courts tend to follow the same
practice. Moreover, if a hearing on forfeiture is
required, Edwards, for instance, observed that
‘hearsay evidence, including the unavailable witness’s
out-of-court statements, may be considered.’ The
Roberts approach to the Confrontation Clause
undoubtedly made recourse to this doctrine less
necessary, because prosecutors could show the
‘reliability’ of ex parte statements more easily than
they could show the defendant’s procurement of the
witness’s absence. Crawford, in overruling Roberts,
did not destroy the ability of the courts to protect the
integrity of their proceedings.86
That the opinion states that Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(6) codifies the constitutional estoppel by wrongdoing
doctrine necessarily means that it is aimed at witness tampering,
and that it also includes the specific intent requirement found in
that rule. The Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of
Evidence concluded early in its discussions that “codifying the
n.6. But it has never been viewed as forfeiture of constitutional rights. The
homicide is only one element of the exception, and standing alone, does not
lead to the admissibility of the dying declaration. See infra notes 105-110 and
accompanying text.
85
See supra note 61.
86
Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280 (citations omitted).
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doctrine was desirable as matter of policy in light of the large
number of witnesses who are intimidated or incapacitated so
they do not testify.”87 The rule was a direct response to almost
20 years of federal case law dealing with witness intimidation in
organized crime and drug conspiracies. As drafted and as
adopted, the Rule always required that the defendant specifically
intend to prevent the witness from testifying.88 The Advisory
Committee thought that the limited application of the Rule was
so clear that it rejected a comment to the Rule specifically
mentioning witness tampering.89 Given the rejection of the
windfall argument, the focus on judicial integrity, and the
statement that Rule 804(b)(6) codifies that doctrine, the only
logical conclusion is that estoppel by wrongdoing is limited to
witness tampering just as the Federal Rule is so limited.90
87

FED. R. EVID. 804 Advisory Committee’s Note (May 4-5, 1995). The
Advisory Committee Note to the Rule also identified witness-tampering as its
rationale. “This recognizes the need for a prophylactic rule to deal with
abhorrent behavior ‘which strikes at the heart of the justice system itself.’”
United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984). Mastrangelo involved a witness killed on his
way to testify. Id.
88
Flanagan, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing, supra note 5, at 477-79. The
final Rule differed from the initial draft only in that it referred to “forfeiture”
rather than waiver by wrongdoing, and changed the language from “a party
who has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing,” to “a party that” to clarify
that the rule also applied to the government. Id. at 478-79.
89
Minutes of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence
(Apr. 22, 1996).
90
Additional, although limited, circumstantial evidence comes from the
cases mentioned in the last paragraph. All involved witness tampering or
significant questions of intent. Reynolds, of course, was a witness tampering
case. The Court also cited Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 172
(2005), in which the Massachusetts Supreme Court adopted the estoppel
doctrine, including the requirement that the defendant must intend to prevent
the witness from testifying. Id. at 175. Also mentioned was Scott v. United
States, 284 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2002) which applied only Federal Rule
804(b)(6) because the defendant did not assert a confrontation claim. Id. at
762. In both cases there was evidence of the defendant’s desire that the
witness not testify, and of contact with the witness, but there were difficult
questions of whether the witness elected not to testify for independent reasons
that were not chargeable to the defendant. Thus, all the estoppel cases cited
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The second paragraph of section IV of the Davis opinion
discusses procedural issues. The Court notes that both state and
federal courts generally require the government to demonstrate
the elements of estoppel by a preponderance of the evidence.
Furthermore, Justice Scalia states that if a hearing is required on
the issue, at least one state supreme court permits the use of
hearsay evidence, including the absent declarant’s hearsay
statements, in determining the hearsay’s admissibility. Neither of
these issues is particularly controversial and the Court approved
of the preponderance standard on questions of the admissibility
of evidence in Bourjaily v. United States.91 Similarly, Federal
Rule of Evidence 104(a) authorizes courts to consider the
statement itself in determining its admissibility, except in cases
of privilege. Most courts have thus adopted the preponderance
standard,92 although some have applied higher standards.93
Generally, trial judges have considered the estoppel issues in a
separate hearing.94 The proffered victim hearsay is often
in Section IV involved deliberate witness-tampering, which is unlikely to be a
coincidence.
91
483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987).
92
United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United
States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1280 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v.
Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d
624, 629 (10th Cir. 1979); Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (6th Cir.
1982); United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982); State
v. Gettings, 769 P.2d 25, 29 (Kan. 1989); State v. Magouirk, 539 So. 2d 50,
64-66 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
93
The Fifth Circuit initially adopted the “clear and convincing” standard
in United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 631 (5th Cir. 1982), as did a few
other federal courts. United States v. Houlihan, 887 F. Supp. 352, 360 (D.
Mass. 1995), aff’d in result but using preponderance standard, 92 F.3d.
1271, 1280 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Smith, 792 F.2d 441, 442 (4th
Cir. 1986). The drafters of Federal Rule 804(b)(6) rejected a higher standard
and adopted the preponderance standard which most courts were using.
Minutes of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence (May
4-5, 1995). New York state courts adopted the clear and convincing standard.
People v. Geraci, 649 N.E.2d 817, 822 (N.Y. 1995).
94
United States v. Price, 265 F.3d 1097, 1100 (10th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d. 811, 813 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Thai,
29 F.3d 785, 814-15 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45,
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important and the testimony and arguments can be a mini-trial of
the defendant’s responsibility for the act. Some courts, such as
the Second Circuit and the high courts of New York and
Massachusetts, require a hearing,95 while other courts do not.96
The discussion of estoppel by wrongdoing in Davis supports
only the proposition that the Court believes that an intent to
tamper with a witness is a prerequisite to the application of the
estoppel doctrine, and that acts that have the unintended
consequence of making the witness unavailable, as in an
ordinary homicide case, do not result in the forfeiture of the
right to object to victim hearsay. The Court did not explicitly
hold that intent was required, but by finding that Federal Rule
804(b)(6), which contains that element, codifies the doctrine, it
came as close to that conclusion as possible. Likewise, the
Court’s view that the doctrine is aimed at attacks on the judicial
integrity of the system implicitly excludes ordinary criminal acts
against individuals that unintentionally make the person
unavailable as a witness. This result is consistent with the prior
case law on estoppel, and with the Court’s view that
Confrontation rights must be waived, whether explicitly or
47 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Smith, 792 F.2d 441, 442 (4th Cir.
1986); United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 626 (10th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1353 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Houlihan, 887 F.2d 352, 356 (D. Mass. 1995); United States v. White, 838
F. Supp. 618, 621 (D.C. 1993); United States v. Papadakis, 572 F. Supp.
1518 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); United States v. Mastrangelo, 533 F. Supp. 389
(E.D.N.Y. 1982); United States v. Thevis, 84 F.R.D. 57, 61 (N.D. Ga.
1979).
95
United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 656 (2d Cir. 2001); United
States v. Miller, 116 F.3d. 641, 668-69 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding error to admit
hearsay evidence without evidentiary hearing, but harmless under the facts of
this case); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 175 (Mass. 2005);
People v. Johnson, 711 N.E.2d 967, 968-69 (N.Y. 1999) (holding that
hearing required unless overwhelming evidence supports clear and convincing
link between defendant and witness’ unavailability).
96
See United States v. Johnson, 219 F.3d 349, 356 (4th Cir. 2000)
(using meeting with counsel to discuss proof); United States v. Emery, 186
F.3d 921, 926 (8th Cir. 1999) (admitting evidence subject to later proof of
witness’ murder); Crutchfield v. United States, 779 A.2d 307, 329-32 (D.C.
2000) (approving proffer of expected testimony).
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implicitly, to be lost; they cannot be lost simply because there is
evidence that the defendant committed a crime.97 Completely
missing from the discussion is any hint that intent is irrelevant to
the estoppel doctrine, or that forfeiture follows automatically
from a determination that the defendant is responsible for the
witness’ unavailability. Davis seems to have clearly adopted the
intent to prevent testimony element. For the Court to reverse
course at this point would require a major reformulation of the
rationale and purpose of the estoppel doctrine, and the rejection
of the well established historical record that admitted absent
witness hearsay only when the defendant intended to prevent the
witness from testifying.98
Moreover, a rejection of the intent element would also
abandon Crawford’s grounding in the history of the
Confrontation Clause. All of the English and early American
cases cited in Reynolds were witness tampering cases.99 Nor
does English history provide any basis for the true forfeiture
doctrine espoused in some post-Crawford cases. At the time the
Bill of Rights was drafted, English law provided only two
instances in which an unavailable victim’s statement could be
admitted against a defendant as substantive evidence, neither of
which provides any support for a true forfeiture principle.100
Sworn depositions in felony cases produced in conformity with
the Marian statutes could be admitted if the witness was dead or
unable to appear, but not merely because the witness was

97

Flanagan, The Misnamed Exception for “Forfeiture” by Wrongdoing,
supra note 4 at 1223-29.
98
The Court is speaking with one voice on this issue, as it did when it
accepted the estoppel by wrongdoing doctrine in Crawford. Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor concurred in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69-76,
and Justice Thomas concurred only in Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280-85. Both
opinions discussed the estoppel doctrine using the collective “we” and the
concurring justices did not comment on the estoppel doctrine in either case.
99
Flanagan, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing, supra note 5 at 462-66.
100
Thomas Y. Davies, Not “The Framers’ Design:” How the FramingEra Ban Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis “Testimonial”
Formulation of the Scope of the Original Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. &
POL’Y 349 (2007).
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unavailable.101 Crawford, however, squarely held that the
Confrontation Clause was directed against the Marian statutes,
and particularly the creation of uncross-examined evidence by
the government.102
The dying declaration provided the other means to admit
absent victim hearsay as substantive evidence. As a principle of
evidence, the dying declaration is based on the declarant’s
knowledge of impending death.
The principle of this exception to the general rule is
founded partly on the awful situation of the dying
person, which is considered to be as powerful over
his conscience as the obligation of an oath, and partly
on the supposed absence of interest on the verge of
the next world, which dispenses with the necessity of
cross-examination. But before such declarations can
be admitted in evidence against a prisoner, it must be
satisfactorily proved, that the deceased, at the time of
making them, was conscious of his danger, and had
given up all hope of recovery.103
As Professor Davies has noted, English law treated the
statements by one full of awe at approaching death as the
functional equivalent of a statement taken under oath.104 Thus,
the dying declaration and the Marian statutes were sufficient to
take these statements out of the rule that prohibited the
admission of unsworn statements.105 Courts in America accepted
dying declarations,106 and the Supreme Court recognized this
101

Id. (discussing the Marian statutes, 1 & 2 Phil. & M. c. 13 (1554);,
2 & 3 id., c 10 (1555) that where adopted during the reign of Mary Tudor
and permitted use of hearsay without confrontation); Crawford, 541 U.S. at
43-44 (same).
102
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51.
103
JOHN F. ARCHBOLD, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW RELATIVE TO
PLEADING AND EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES; WITH PRECEDENTS OF
INDICTMENTS, &C. AND THE EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THEM 200-01
(1824).
104
Davies, supra, note 100.
105
Id. at 95.
106
The early evidence texts refer to it. ARCHBOLD, supra note 103 (“the
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exception to the Confrontation Clause based on its history. The
Court referred to the admissibility of dying declarations from
“time immemorial,” asserting that “no one would have the
hardihood at this day to question their admissibility.”107
The dying declaration is not a precursor to the forfeiture
doctrine. It is based on the inherent reliability of the dying
declarant’s statement, and not upon the defendant’s intent to
prevent testimony found in Reynolds, or on the forfeiture
analysis that emerged after Crawford. At most, the dying
declaration exception supports the proposition that some limited
victim hearsay as to the cause of death could be deemed
consistent with the Confrontation Clause. To transmogrify it into
a justification for the forfeiture principle shifts its rationale from
the mental state of the declarant to the act of the defendant
(regardless of the mental state) and expands a narrow exception
for explaining the cause of death in only homicide prosecutions
to a general rule which would admit all victim statements for
any purpose. These structural changes are far beyond the history
and precedent of the dying declaration.108 Despite the rise of the
dying declarations of the deceased are receivable in evidence, if it appear that
he was conscious of his being in a dying state at the time he made them”);
CHITTY, Vol. 1 A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 569 (1841)
(stating that the dying declaration is the “one great and important exception”
to the hearsay rule); PEAKE, COMPENDIUM ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 14-16
(3rd ed. 1812) (dying declaration admissible “for murder where the deceased,
while in the declared apprehension of death, or in such imminent danger of it
as must necessarily have raised that apprehension in his mind”); PHILLIPPS,
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 275-200 (1816) (“The dying
declarations of a person who has received a mortal injury, are constantly
admitted in criminal prosecutions.”).
107
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895).
108
Professor Richard Friedman suggests that dying declarations may be
better rationalized as an example of the forfeiture principle. He argues that
this approach preserves the clarity and simplicity of the “testimonial”
approach, avoids an exception based on history, and accepting the traditional,
and unpersuasive, argument for the reliability of dying declarations. Richard
D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Decision Restores
Confrontation Clause Protection, 19 CRIM. JUSTICE 4, 12 (Summer 2004).
Certainly, a true forfeiture principle would subsume dying declarations, but
that is using the post-Crawford appearance of the true forfeiture argument
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forfeiture argument in the 1990s and its adoption by some postCrawford cases, the limited exception of the dying declaration
does not provide any historical justification or pedigree for the
modern forfeiture doctrine.
III. FORESHADOWING THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE ESTOPPEL BY WRONGDOING
A. The Intent Element and the Link Between the Defendant’s
Act and the Witness’s Refusal to Testify
Davis answers the most pressing issue about the
constitutional doctrine of confrontation estoppel: the intent
element. The doctrine requires proof of intent to prevent
testimony before a defendant can lose the right to confront a
witness or object to a hearsay statement by a victim. However,
the nexus between the defendant’s acts and the witness’ refusal
to testify is not well defined in the case law. A few courts have
held that the defendant has the intent to prevent testimony if the
victim’s potential testimony was “a factor” in the decision to act
against the witness.109 Another formulation asks whether witness
intimidation was in “any way” a motivation.110 At the same
time, the courts have specifically rejected any requirement that
witness tampering be the sole motive for intimidation.111 The
courts do not seem to have addressed the link in the context of
today to rationalize the long history of dying declarations that were
admissible under a different theory than forfeiture. It does not establish that
forfeiture is derived from the exemption for dying declarations.
109
United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 654 (2d Cir. 2001); United
States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v.
Johnson, 219 F.3d 349, 356 (4th Cir. 2000).
110
State v. Romero, 133 P.3d 842, 856 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006), aff’d.
No. 29,690 (N.M. March. 15 2007), http://www.suprementcourt.nm.org/
slipopinions, cert. granted, 134 P.3d 120 (N.M. 2006).
111
United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 654 (2d Cir. 2001); United
States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279 (1st Cir. 1996).
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the witness’ decision, perhaps because there was generally
strong proof that the defendants caused the witness’
unavailability for trial.
Basing a loss of constitutional rights whenever witness
tampering was “a” factor in the defendant’s decision is a test so
flexible and so easily satisfied that it suffers from the same
defect that Crawford found in the reliability standard of Ohio v.
Roberts.112 Applied strictly, a minimal test of causation means
that intimidation and refusal will produce forfeiture even though
the wrongful acts were not a primary or even a significant
reason for either the defendant’s threats or the witness’ refusal
to testify. A stronger causal connection between the defendant’s
act and the witness’ response is necessary. Moreover, the issue
of intent is so critical that other procedural protections are
necessary. A hearing should be required before admitting these
statements, and the victim’s hearsay statement itself should not
be the sole basis for admitting it.113
B. The Nexus Between the Defendant’s Intention and Act
and the Witness’ Refusal to Testify
The homicide case Gonzalez v. State illustrates the potential
for the marginalization of the intent element as well as the need
for a strong causal connection.114 The Texas Court of Appeals
initially held that the intent requirement was unnecessary.115 On
appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, that court noted
the competing arguments regarding the intent element, but
avoided the issue by finding that the defendant had the requisite
intent when the defendant killed the victims during a burglary

112

Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 62-69 (discussing defects of Roberts reliability test).
113
See, e.g, Deborah Tuerkheimer, A Relational Approach to
Confrontation, SYMPOSIUM MATERIALS at 202 n.80) (suggesting the need for
an evidentiary hearing on the estoppel argument).
114
Gonzalez v. State, 195 S.W. 3d 114 (Tex Crim. App. 2006).
115
Gonzalez v. State, 155 S.W. 3d 603 (Tex. App. 2004), aff’d, No.
PD-0247-05, 2006 WL 1688345 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
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and theft.116 The facts, fairly interpreted, do not show intent to
prevent witness testimony. The defendant entered a home near
that of his grandmother and fatally wounded Maria and
Baldomero Herrera before stealing their truck.117 Mrs. Herrera
identified the defendant to the responding officer by his unusual
hair color and his relationship to a neighbor. Gonzalez was
arrested the same day driving the pickup truck with Mr.
Herrera’s address book in his pocket and Mrs. Herrera’s blood
on his clothes.118 Other than seeing each other in the area, the
defendant and his victims apparently had no prior contact, and
there was no pending matter about which they would testify
against the defendant. Nevertheless, the court found that the
killing was intended to prevent testimony simply because the
victims could identify him.119
The court’s conclusion was based on three elements: (1) the
victims could identify the defendant because of his distinctive
hair color and relationship to a neighbor; (2) the defendant
entered their home without a disguise; and (3) the murders were
particularly violent, as both victims were shot at close range.120
None of these factors is characteristic of intent to prevent
testimony, nor do they distinguish between a murder motivated
by expected testimony and one motivated by greed, rage, or
revenge. In fact, the same arguments support a finding of intent
to prevent testimony in every homicide. Here the victims did
have a preexisting basis to identify the defendant, but all
surviving crime victims have the potential to identify the
perpetrator. Therefore, if these victims are killed in the course
of a crime, all defendants can be assumed to have the requisite
intent to prevent testimony. Likewise, the defendant’s lack of
disguise is not a reliable indicator of the defendant’s motivation
for the crime. Here, the court found the lack of disguise proof
of the defendant’s awareness of the risk of identification, which
116
117
118
119
120

Gonzalez, 2006 WL 1688345 at *2-7.
Id.
Id. at *1-3.
Id. at *7.
Id.
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supplied a motive to satisfy the estoppel rule. However, a
defendant’s decision to wear a disguise would reflect greater
concern about possible identification, and arguably an even
greater motive to silence the witness. Intent, then, can be found
regardless of the presence or absence of a disguise. Finally, and
unfortunately, murders, particularly first-degree double murders
by gunshot, are inevitably violent acts. Characterizing a murder
as a violent act is not an adequate premise for a finding of intent
to prevent the victims from testifying. The court clearly assumed
the intent element by an extremely tenuous causal chain that will
supply the requisite intent for estoppel by wrongdoing in any
violent homicide.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Texas’ highest
criminal court, had obvious reasons for its specious reasoning.
The assumption of witness tampering intent allowed the court to
avoid both speaking on an issue the Supreme Court had yet to
address and reversing a conviction for a heinous crime when
there was little doubt of the defendant’s guilt. Even assuming
that these are legitimate motives, the case also illustrates the
pressures that courts face in ruling on proof of intent and the
strong desire to find a way to admit evidence that is clearly
testimonial. Routine acceptance of such reasoning will leave the
intent element with little meaning or effect, and estoppel by
wrongdoing will swallow Crawford’s revitalized Confrontation
Clause in domestic violence cases. Similarly, a standard of
causation that requires only that potential testimony be a factor
in the defendant’s act eliminates the causation element even
when there are other, much more likely reasons for the act.
The more common and more difficult question of causation
arises when the witness could testify but does not, leaving the
court to determine whether the witness’ refusal is due to
defendant’s acts or the witness’ own unrelated reasons. The
witness’ motivation is always an issue, even if the Court
ultimately concludes that estoppel by wrongdoing does not
require the defendant to intend to prevent the witness from
testifying. In every claim of confrontation estoppel there must
always be proof that the defendant’s act was the procuring cause
of the witness’ refusal to testify. Estoppel cannot be applied if
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the defendant’s threats were made well before the crime against
the potential witness121 or were not received by the victim.122
Likewise, when the witness refuses to testify for his own
reasons, the defendant cannot be estopped to object to the
hearsay.123
Domestic violence prosecutions are the most problematic
because many victims—by some accounts 80 to 90 percent—do
not cooperate with the prosecution.124 Consequently, some have
121

State v. Romero, 133 P.3d 842, 856 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006), aff’d,
No. 29,690 (N.M. March 15, 2007), http://www.suprementcourt.nm.org/
The slip opinion presents these facts because the defendant’s threats were
made three months before the couple met during the holidays. Despite the
fact that the defendant had threatened her about going to the police three
months before, it strains logic to conclude that the homicide involved in the
case was related to these threats in any way. The New Mexico Supreme
Court remanded the case for a determination of the defendant’s intent while
noting that it was unlikely that he had the intent to prevent her from
testifying. Id. at 15.
122
State v. Washington, 521 N.W.2d 21, 42 (Minn. 1994) (finding no
proof that declarant heard threats).
123
United States v. Williamson, 792 F. Supp. 805, 810 (M.D. Ga.
1992) (noting that evidence that defendant paid witness’ attorneys fees
insufficient to show that defendant had procured witness’ unavailability
through witness’ assertion of Fifth Amendment because he had independent
reason to refuse to testify because testimony could affect pending appeal),
aff’d, 981 F.2d 1262 (11th Cir. 1992), rev’d on other grounds, 512 U.S. 594
(1994).
124
While it is uncontested that many domestic violence victims do not
cooperate, the authorities do not define what cooperation means or indicate
what percentage may be attributed to the defendant or to the election of the
victim. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 94 P.3d 574, 576 (Cal. 2004) (noting
that an expert testified that 80-85 percent of victims recant at some point);
People v. Gomez, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 105 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (noting
that an expert witness testified that 80 percent of domestic violence witnesses
recant, change, or minimize the incident); Douglas E. Beloof & Joel Shapiro,
Let the Truth be Told; Proposed Hearsay Exceptions to Admit Domestic
Violence Victims’ Out of Court Statements As Substantive Evidence, 11
COLUM J. GENDER & L. 1, 3-4 (2002) (citing expert testimony); Lisa Marie
De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice for
Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 359, 367 (1996)
(citing interview with prosecutor in contact with expert witnesses throughout
the country)

FLANAGAN

6/22/2007 1:10 AM

FORESHADOWING THE FUTURE OF FORFEITURE 895
argued that a battering relationship should be sufficient to
conclude that the defendant was the cause of the witness’
decision, and consequently he has no right of confrontation
regarding that victim’s hearsay.125 This argument is wrong in
theory and in practice because it necessarily requires evidence
that every battering relationship produces unavailability. Without
a precise one-to-one relationship between abuse and
unavailability, an unknown number of defendants would
arbitrarily lose their Sixth Amendment rights. There is no
dispute that a large number of victims in battering relationships
do not testify, but correlation is not causation.
Logically, there are three potential causes for a witness’
failure to testify when available: (1) the defendant’s actions; (2)
the witness’s independent decision; and (3) actions of third
parties or other intervening events, including the state’s failure
to bring the witness to court.126 Commentators recognize that
defendants are not the only cause of the failure of witnesses to
testify and that witnesses often refuse to testify because of
legitimate concerns about privacy, possible self-incrimination,
prior inconsistent statements, or the desirability of preserving
pre-existing relationships.127 Mere reluctance to testify128 should
125

Andrew King-Ries, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing: A Panacea for
Victimless Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 441, 46970 (2006); Adam M. Krischer, Though Justice May be Blind, It Is Not
Stupid, 38 PROSECUTOR 14 (Nov. Dec. 2004).
126
United States v. Olivares, 1997 WL 257479, at *2 (S.D.N.Y 2004)
(holding that the government is responsible for absconding witness’ absence
when it ignored statute requiring potential witness awaiting sentencing to be
held pending sentence and released him).
127
Tom Lininger, Yes, Virginia, There is a Confrontation Clause, 71
BROOK. L. REV. 401, 407 (2005); Deborah Tuerkheimer, A Relational
Approach to Confrontation, SYMPOSIUM MATERIALS, 177, 202 n.80 (2006)
(citing Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too:
Crawford’s Impact on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK.
L. REV. 311, 361-62 (2005)).
128
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 856 (1990) (finding that special
protections for child witness are not available solely because of the normal
anxiety of testifying); Contreras v. State, 910 So. 2d 901 (Fla. Dis. Ct. App.
2005) (holding that child witness is not unavailable because of generalized
claims of trauma and mental anguish from testifying).
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not be chargeable to the defendant under any reasonable theory
of causation. The advocates for automatic loss of confrontation
rights must establish this strong causal link to support that
proposition.129
As argued above, a causation test that is satisfied only by
proof that the defendant’s act was “a” factor for the witness’
unavailability is too easily satisfied. There are great pressures to
minimize the causal link because of the perceived need for the
testimony, so it is necessary to clearly articulate this link if the
intent element is to be meaningful. Proper application of the
burden of proof standard requires articulating how it should be
applied in this context. The preponderance standard is often
viewed as requiring that the critical fact be “more likely than
not” or “more probably true than not.”130 If the defendant’s
conduct is more likely than not the cause of the witness’
unavailability, then other potential causes are by definition less
likely, and vice versa. I suggest that courts articulate and apply
a “but for” test when evaluating both the defendant’s motivation
for acting against a person and the witness’ failure to testify.
This test asks whether the defendant would have acted against
the witness but for the potential for testimony against him.
Similarly, it asks whether the witness would have testified but
for the defendant’s intimidation. By articulating a test that
focuses on the predominant factor, rather than just “a” factor,
129

Distinguishable from the argument that the battering relationship is
per se proof of causation for witness unavailability, is the proposition that
evidence of the nature of the battering relationship may be part of the proof
that establishes the defendant’s responsibility for the witness’ refusal to
testify. Professor Tuerkheimer argues persuasively that an understanding of
the domestic relationship is essential to a proper evaluation of the evidence
about the cause of a refusal to testify, and places in context acts that
otherwise might seem benign or unrelated to the potential testimony. Deborah
Tuerkheimer, A Relational Approach to Confrontation, SYMPOSIUM
MATERIALS at 177. Professor Tuerkheimer makes clear that specific
causation must be established between the defendant and the victim’s refusal
to testify, and as I understand her position, views evidence of the battering
relationship as necessary to understand the evidence, but not sufficient in
itself to establish the cause of the witness’ refusal to testify. Id at 202.
130
Mueller & Kirkpatrick, EVIDENCE, §3.3 at 109 (3d ed. 2003).
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the courts can directly address the causal link and will be less
likely to marginalize the intent element, and more likely to seek
evidence to support the conclusion.131
Of course, issues of proximate cause are difficult to capture
completely in words, many issues of fact are difficult to
quantify, and any language is likely to be somewhat imprecise.
However, such language is important because it provides
guidance to the court in close cases. Articulating a test that
emphasizes the causal link between the defendant and the
witness is particularly important with confrontation estoppel
because admissibility issues are subject to review under the
abuse of discretion standard, which is highly deferential to the
trial judge.132 For all but the rare case, the trial judge’s decision
on questions of causation will survive on appeal, and words that
convey more than a minimal connection are necessary to prevent
an over-broad estoppel by wrongdoing doctrine.
Another reason for a clearly articulated causation test is the
state’s role in the trial process. The Sixth Amendment places the
obligation on the government to produce the witnesses at trial.133
Although the constitutional standard is low and requires only a
good faith effort to obtain the presence of the witness,134 a
minimal causation element for estoppel by wrongdoing further
reduces the government’s obligation, and has the perverse
incentive of undermining the government’s desire to search out
and find the witness when testimonial hearsay is available.
Officers and prosecutors need not further investigate the crime,
and the trial may be easier because the prosecution introduces
131

See United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982)
(remanding for hearing to determine if defendant in custody was responsible
for murder of witness), on remand, 561 F. Supp. 1114 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)
(ruling that evidence of prior statements and acts supported waiver of hearsay
and constitutional rights) aff’d, 722 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1983) (affirming after
remand).
132
Maurice Rosenberg, Appellate Review of Trial Court Discretion, 79
F.R.D. 173 (1978).
133
Barber v. Paige, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (noting that the government
was required to produce witness whose location was known).
134
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980).
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testimonial hearsay through law enforcement personnel who may
be perceived to be neutral and more credible than the declarant,
and the hearsay cannot be modified or recanted by the absent
declarant.135 Several commentators at the Crawford symposium
noted the desirability of an enhanced standard for determining
the unavailability of a witness. A strong causal requirement for
confrontation estoppel advances this goal and emphasizes the
need for sufficient proof to support confrontation estoppel.
C. Declarant Hearsay as the Foundation for Admissibility of
Victim Hearsay
Justice Scalia noted in Davis that other courts have
considered hearsay, including victims’ statements, in
determining the elements of confrontation estoppel.136 In many
cases, the declarant’s own statements are the only proof
establishing the defendant’s responsibility for the witness’
absence and in particular the fact that the defendant’s act was
motivated by a desire to prevent testimony.137 Unresolved is
whether the declarant’s hearsay statements can be the sole
135

Muller & Kirpatrick opine the following:
Of course a prosecutor who has useful hearsay might prefer to
offer it, since bringing the speaker to court may be hard or
costly or time-consuming. Disappointing as well: The speaker
may be frightened or reluctant, and testifying visibly on the
record under oath and subject to cross may persuade him to
back away from what was more easily said in private to a
sympathetic audience of prosecutors and agents. Hence
prosecutors sometimes prefer to offer statements rather than
produce the speaker, and it is not always easy to distinguish
between the effort one might make to find and produce a
speaker and an effort to show he cannot be produced.
Mueller & Kirkpatrick, EVIDENCE, § 8.87 at 977 (3d ed. 2003).
136
Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273; FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
137
United States v. Zlatogur, 271 F.3d 1025, 1028 (11th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v.
Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Balano, 618
F.2d 624, 628-29 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346,
1353 (8th Cir. 1976).
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foundation for their admissibility.138 Requiring independent
evidence avoids the circular argument that inadmissible hearsay
can be the foundation for admitting the otherwise inadmissible
hearsay. More importantly, independent evidence enhances the
reliability of the admissibility decision and of the evidence
admitted, and becomes particularly important with confrontation
estoppel because this exception is not founded on any claim that
the hearsay is reliable, or that the circumstances in which the
statements were made are inherently reliable. In fact, these
testimonial statements are often made by witnesses with
conflicting interests.139 These arguments supported the
amendment of Federal Rule 801(d)(2) in 1997 to provide that the
hearsay statement of a co-conspirator, agent, or employee was
not sufficient to establish the relationship necessary for
admission against the principal.140
138

Compare U.S. v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 927 (8th Cir. 1999)
(expressing doubt that foundation requires evidence independent of the
hearsay and finding sufficient independent evidence) with United States v.
White, 116 F.3d 903, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (leaving undecided whether
foundation can rest exclusively on hearsay). The testimony sometimes
includes double hearsay. See Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1207 (6th Cir.
1982) (Taylor, J., dissenting) (noting that declarant’s statements were of what
she had heard other defendants say); Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217, 226
(2d Cir. 2003) (noting that officers testified to the defendant’s statements that
he had heard that his family was threatened and to the statements of the
defendant’s mother and sister about threats they received).
139
Many declarants in drug and organized crime cases are coconspirators who have their own reasons for cooperating with the government
that may affect the reliability of their statements. Flanagan, Forfeiture by
Wrongdoing, supra note 5 at 471 n. 71-72. See State v. Romero, 133 P.3d
842, 863-64 (N.M. 2006), cert. denied 134 P.3d 120 (N.M. 2006) (noting
that untrue and self-serving statements are made in domestic violence
prosecutions and citing cases).
140
The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules recommended
adopting the amendment to Rule 801(d)(2) and Rule 804(b)(6) at the same
meeting but in separate discussions without any mention or indication in the
minutes that the members saw the topics as related. Certainly there is no
indication that the Committee rejected a requirement in Rule 804(b)(6) that
there be some independent evidence of the predicate facts that support
admitting the hearsay statements. Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules,
Minutes of the Meeting of May 4-5 1995.
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The need for a clear articulation of the nexus between act
and unavailability of the witness, and the need for a foundation
based on more than hearsay itself, also suggests that a pre-trial
hearing on the issue of confrontation estoppel is necessary. The
Court highlighted, but did not decide the issue in Davis.141
While an absolute rule requiring a hearing may generate
problems in isolated cases, the arguments in favor of a hearing
are persuasive. The major problems in the application of
confrontation estoppel revolve around proof of the appropriate
connection between the defendant’s acts and the witness’
unavailability. In every case there must be proof of intent to
prevent testimony, and likewise, if the victim refuses to testify
that it was the result of that intimidation. The case law suggests
that when hearings are held and the issues addressed directly,
sufficient evidence to support the forfeiture doctrine is
available.142
D. Estoppel by Wrongdoing and Rule 804(a)
The finding that the defendant procured the witness’ absence
bars any objection to victim hearsay, and also precludes the
defendant from introducing other hearsay statements of the
unavailable victim under Rule 804(a).143 Even victim testimony
141

Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2279-80.
Flanagan, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing, supra note 5, at 506 (reviewing
evidence of Mastrangelo’s involvement developed on remand).
143
FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5) (detailing that a witness is not unavailable if
absence is procured by proponent of hearsay). The defendant may offer
victim hearsay admissible under Rules 801, 803, or 807 because those rules
do not have an unavailability requirement. Rule 106 allows the defendant to
offer other portions of a written or recorded hearsay statement that are
necessary to place the previously offered testimony in context. This is
apparently so even if the latter statements are otherwise inadmissible. United
States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1283 (1st Cir. 1996); See also Dale A.
Nance, Verbal Completeness and Exclusionary Rules under the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 75 TEX. L. REV. 51 (1996). It does not authorize the admission
of other parts of the statements that are neither explanatory nor relevant to
the previously admitted portions of the testimony. United States v. Marin,
669 F.2d 73, 84-85 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Houlihan, 887 F. Supp.
142
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that exculpates the defendant is barred because the prosecution
retains its rights to object to hearsay proffered by the
defendant.144 Holmes v. South Carolina145 suggests that this
evidentiary limitation is unconstitutional. There, the Court held
arbitrary and unconstitutional South Carolina’s rule barring the
defendant from introducing evidence of a third party’s
responsibility for the crime when the prosecution’s evidence of
guilt was strong. The rule was justified on relevance grounds,
but as the Court recognized, the fact that the prosecution’s
evidence of guilt, if credited, was strong, does not mean that the
defense evidence was not relevant and probative; in fact, when
considered by a trier of fact, it might undermine the perceived
strength of the government’s case.146
The restriction in Rule 804(a) serves a legitimate function
when the wrongdoer proffers the absent witness testimony first.
At the time, it prevents that party from creating and then taking
advantage of a witness’s absence to introduce hearsay, a less
reliable form of evidence, and arguably provides some
deterrence against such wrongdoing by others contemplating
similar action. When applied after the prosecution has admitted
victim hearsay under the estoppel rationale, the rule suffers the
same defects found in Holmes. First, exclusion is not based on
relevance or other Rule 403 grounds, but on the preliminary
finding (by a preponderance of the evidence) that the defendant
is responsible for the witness’s absence. Second, as in Holmes,
it is arbitrary to argue that the strength of the government’s case
justifies excluding the victim’s exculpatory statements when
offered by the defendant. The strength of the government’s case
can only be evaluated by considering all of the evidence, and the
defense evidence might significantly undercut that finding. Even
352, 366 (D. Mass. 1995).
144
United States v. White, 838 F. Supp. 618, 625 n.10 (D.D.C. 1993)
(finding that only defendant waived right); Sweet v. United States, 756 A.2d
366, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that a defendant responsible for witness’s
absence may not admit absent witness, exculpatory statement); Wisconsin v.
Frambs, 460 N.W.2d 811 (Wisc. 1990) (same).
145
126 S. Ct. 1727 (2006).
146
Id. at 1734-35.
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if the judge considered all of the victim’s statements in deciding
the estoppel issue, the trier of fact must make the ultimate
decision of guilt and innocence (beyond a reasonable doubt) and
the rule prevents the jury from hearing admittedly relevant,
probative, and exculpatory evidence that undercuts the
government’s case. This infringes on the defendant’s right to
present a defense, whether found in the Due Process Clause or
the Sixth Amendment.147 The exclusion of exculpatory victim
statements cannot be sustained by arguing that the rule retains a
legitimate purpose at this point. The purpose of the rule has
been served because the defendant was not able to proffer the
victim’s statements first. As for deterrence, it strains logic to
argue that the exclusion of evidence some months after the
alleged wrongdoing serves any deterrence function for the
defendant, nor does it genuinely serve a deterrent function for
others who are unlikely to be deterred by the better known and
more severe criminal law sanctions. Whatever shreds of
justification survive the introduction of a victim’s testimony
cannot outweigh the constitutional right to present a defense that
includes other relevant, and potentially contradictory or
exculpatory statements of the absent witness.
Holmes, as applied to the last sentence of Rule 804(a),
means that the defendant is not barred from asserting that the
declarant is unavailable under that Rule. Admissibility of the
absent victim’s statement depends upon satisfying one of the
Rule 804 exceptions. Prior testimony, dying declarations, and
statements against interest are now available to the defendant,
and may be the basis of admitting other victim hearsay. The
exception for prior testimony may be particularly useful because
many prior victim statements might have been made in earlier
proceedings, including preliminary hearings and grand juries.148
147

Id. at 1731.
Rule 804(b)(1) requires that the testimony be in a proceeding in
which the party against whom the testimony is offered “had an opportunity or
similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross or redirect
examination.” United States v. Foster, 128 F.3d 949, 954 (6th Cir. 1997).
There is case authority that grand jury testimony can be admitted against the
government. Id. at 954-56.
148
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Similarly, many victim statements arise in circumstances where
the exculpatory value to the defendant exposes the declarant to
potential criminal or civil prosecution.
This issue also throws some light on the so-called
“reflexive” use of victim hearsay in cases in which the
defendant is charged with the crime that produced the witness’
unavailability.149 The concern is that the pre-trial ruling on the
defendant’s responsibility for the crime will affect the trial of the
case. The usual response is that the evidence decision is made
by the judge, and the finding of guilt is made by the jury so that
one does not affect the other.150 Rule 804 provides one instance
in which the pre-trial finding does affect the jury by excluding
exculpatory evidence offered by the defendant under that Rule,
and where the judge would be aware of evidence favorable to
the defendant but the jury would not. The solution is not to bar
the reflexive use of the victim’s statements, but to admit all such
victim statements that satisfy the rule regardless of the limitation
in Rule 804(a).
CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia’s decision to leave the key issues of the
definition of testimonial and the scope of estoppel by
wrongdoing to future opinions has led to great uncertainty about
Crawford’s application in many circumstances. Davis provides a
strong indication on the scope of estoppel by wrongdoing and all
but holds that it is aimed at witness tampering and cannot be
expanded to apply when the defendant’s actions have the
149

Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 5, at 521-25.
Id. at 23-24. Courts have had little problem with the reflexive use of
victim hearsay. See e.g., United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 814 (2d Cir.
1994) (murder as part of extortion); United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47
(2d Cir. 1992) (showing conspiracy to import heroin and witness tampering);
United States v. Houlihan, 887 F. Supp. 352, 355-56 (D. Mass. 1995)
(showing drug conspiracy and murder in furtherance of racketeering); United
States v. White, 838 F. Supp. 618, 625 (D.D.C. 1993) (noting that
declarant’s statement were admissible as if declarant was testifying in court).
Generally the jury would be aware of the reasons for the declarant’s absence
in those cases.
150
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unintended effect of making a witness unavailable. This will be
controversial because Crawford has its greatest impact on
domestic violence prosecutions and there is great pressure to
admit the absent victim testimony. At the same time,
confrontation is a core value of the Constitution. Crawford has
made the Confrontation Clause meaningful as to testimonial
statements. Moreover, the Court seems to have rejected an
argument based solely on the need for the testimony. The need
argument was raised, but as Justice Scalia noted in Davis: “We
may not, however, vitiate constitutional guarantees when they
have the effect of allowing the guilty to go free.”151
Constitutional rights that provide no protection have no
meaning. As the constitutional doctrine of estoppel by
wrongdoing develops, the courts will have to address this intent
element, and the nexus between the defendant’s acts and the
witness’ decision not to appear or testify. Proper proof of this
link, as well as the procedural protections of a pretrial hearing
and a requirement of evidence in addition to the hearsay
statement itself to support admissibility appear necessary to the
proper operation of estoppel by wrongdoing.

151

Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280 (citation omitted).

